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Cuba’s	Challenges	Hosting	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	and	
The	Spectacle	of	the	Revolution’s	“Soft”	Power1	
	
“Distinguidos	invitados,	atletas,	compatriotas,	
	declaro	inaugurado	los	oncenos	juegos	panamericanos.	Muchas	gracias.”	
	
In	what	was	probably	the	shortest	speech	of	Fidel	Castro’s	life,	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	were	
opened	in	Cuba.2	More	characteristically,	the	official	opening	of	the	Villa	Panamericana	(Pan	American	
Village)	the	week	prior	to	the	start	of	the	actual	Games	provided	the	venue	for	Castro	to	pontificate	at	
length	on	sport,	revolution,	and	the	impending	Games.	Rife	with	symbolism,	the	opening	of	the	Villa	
Panamericana	took	place	on	26	July,	the	most	important	date	in	the	Revolutionary	calendar,	the	date	
that	named	Castro’s	Revolutionary	movement.	That	ceremony	included	the	recently	released	Nelson	
Mandela	and	other	African	National	Congress	dignitaries	and	more	closely	exemplified	the	Cuban	use	of	
sport	through	Castro’s	common	rhetorical	strategy	explicitly	linking	local	events	with	the	rest	of	the	
world	and	current	political	events.	Linking	Mandela’s	strength	of	character,	experience	with	
Revolutionary	struggle,	and	love	of	sport	with	the	impending	international	spectacle,	Castro’s	speech	
demonstrated	the	powerful	linkages	the	Cuban	saw	in	the	use	of	the	soft	power	of	sport.3	
	 This	article	parallels	Castro’s	and	the	Cuban	government’s	ongoing	strategy	of	linking	local	
events	with	international	contexts,	events,	and	concerns	by	examining	various	machinations	happening	
in	the	five	years’	prior	to	the	1991	Pan	American	Games.	The	international	contexts	throughout	the	lead	
up	to	the	Games	demonstrate	the	swirling	eddies	of	power	that	help	to	shape	each	and	every	
international	sport	spectacle	in	relation	to	the	localized	national	circumstances	in	those	particular	
moments.		As	these	are	constantly	evolving	political	economic	processes,	it	needs	to	be	emphasized	
that,	although	Cuba	hosted	the	Pan	American	Games	25	years	ago,	the	various	currents	that	shaped	
those	Games	continue	and	increasingly	affect	global	sport	spectacles,	albeit	in	related	yet	decidedly	
different	ways.			
How	these	global	political	currents	influenced	Cuba’s	preparations	for	the	1991	Pan	American	
Games	is	the	explicit	focus	of	this	article	with	an	implicit	consideration	of	how	they	affected	Cuba’s	
standing.	International	sport	spectacles	serve	as	attention	attractors	that	can	be	used	to	entice	others	to	
its	siren	call.	It	rests	on	the	ability	to	shape	the	preferences	of	others.		This	sort	of	persuasive	power	is	
what	Nye	calls	“soft	power”	because	it	is	a	form	of	diplomatic	statecraft	that	avoids	threats	or	acts	of	
force.4	Normally,	soft	power	is	associated	with	intangible	assets	of	a	state	such	as	a	leader’s	attractive	
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personality,	a	culture,	a	nation’s	set	of	values	or	institutions	and	that	government’s	politics	are	
perceived	as	having	moral	gravitas	and	legitimacy.	The	soft	power	of	a	country	tends	to	rest	on	three	
principal	resources:	its	culture,	its	political	values	at	home	and	overseas,	and	its	foreign	policies.	Nye	
points	out	that	soft	power	is	not	the	equivalent	of	popular	culture	and	it	is	not	merely	the	generative	
influence	of	the	behavior	produced	through	cultural	resources.	Rather,	I	extend	Nye’s	concept	by	
arguing	that	international	sport	spectacles	are	explicit	deployments	of	soft	power.		
To	do	this,	a	brief	consideration	of	the	ideological	underpinnings	of	the	Pan	American	Games	
themselves	as	a	potential	international	relations	vehicle	is	provided.	From	that	outline,	the	
Revolutionary	government’s	emphasis	on	humanitarian	internationalism	as	part	of	its	ongoing	foreign	
policy	strategy	and	the	political	instrument	that	sport	becomes	are	briefly	touched	upon.	Finally,	the	
domestic	political	economy	at	the	time	of	the	Games	serves	as	the	background	for	a	discussion	of	the	
construction	of	the	1991	Games’	infrastructure	with	a	dedicated	focus	on	Villa	Panamericana	on	the	
eastern	outskirts	of	Havana.	Throughout	these	discussions,	an	awareness	of	the	historiography	of	Cuban	
sport	and	the	near	total	absence	of	directly	related	Cuban	scholarship	constrains	the	entirety	of	this	
article.	Further	elaboration	on	this	particular	limitation	is	directly	addressed	below	and	sets	the	stage	for	
the	rest	of	this	piece.	
	
Historical	Contexts	of	Cuban	History	and	Scholarship5	
There	is	a	facile	sense	outside	of	Cuba	that	the	social	sciences	and	history	in	Cuban	academia	are	not	
really	“true”	academic	disciplines	with	critical	scholars	engaged	in	serious	enquiry.	A	prevalent	
presumption	is	that	the	Cuban	populace,	including	its	intelligentsia,	is	so	“brainwashed”	or	indoctrinated	
into	the	ways	of	the	Revolution,	of	Marxist	Communism,	that	they	cannot	possibly	be	able	to	critique	or	
think	for	themselves.	This	condescending	position	is	easily	disproven	by	merely	going	to	a	bar,	café,	
university	classroom,	stadium,	or	peña	in	Havana	and	listening	to	the	locals.	Arguments	over	baseball,	
the	economy,	the	government,	civil	society,	or	even	history	all	percolate.6	It	is	not	that	debate	is	not	
allowed;	in	fact,	it	is	encouraged,	albeit	along	certain	lines.	Cuban	intelligentsia	drives	these	debates.	An	
example	of	this	is	the	ongoing	weekly	television	show,	UltimoJueves	(Last	Thursday)	in	which	leading	
Cuban	intellectuals	debate	a	particular	topic.7	Each	season’s	shows	are	transcribed	and	published,	
fostering	further	discussion	amongst	those	who	viewed	the	program	thus	continuing	the	debate	each	
show	initially	raised.	That	debate	is	to	follow	certain	prescriptions	is	no	different	than	anywhere	else	in	
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the	world.	There	is	not	a	government	in	the	world	that	does	not	react	violently	to	the	perceived	(not	
necessarily	actual)	threats	by	individuals	advocating	for	the	overthrow	of	the	government.8		
The	denial	of	Cubans’	capacity	to	decide	for	themselves	is	a	legacy	of	not	just	the	Cold	War	
hostilities	between	the	US	and	Cuban	governments	throughout	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century	
but	a	longer	rift	in	which	the	US	government	has	never	fully	recognized	the	sovereignty	of	the	Cuban	
nation,	instead	using	military	force	and	economic	leverage	to	impose	its	will	on	Cuba.	Prior	to	the	
Revolution,	the	US	not	only	occupied	Cuba,	it	forced	Cuban	leaders	immediately	after	the	Cubans’	War	
of	Independence	–	what	is	blithely	called	the	“Spanish-American	War”	with	Teddy	Roosevelt’s	Rough	
Riders	the	central	figures	immediately	riding/writing	the	Cubans	out	of	their	own	history	–	to	write	into	
their	own	constitution	a	passage	that	gave	the	US	Government	the	right	to	intervene	in	Cuba’s	domestic	
affairs	whenever	it	was	the	in	the	interest	of	the	United	States	to	do	so.		Hated	by	the	Cubans,	the	Platt	
Amendment	was	finally	abrogated	in	1934	after	the	1933	Revolution	that	ousted	the	dictator	Gerardo	
Machado,	but	that	did	not	end	the	paternalistic	relationship	in	which	the	US	ambassador	effectively	
determined	the	leadership	of	the	Cuban	state.9	It	was	only	with	the	overthrow	of	the	Batista	regime	in	
1959	and	the	success	of	Castro-led	forces	that	the	Cuban	Revolution,	a	centuries-long	nationalist	
struggle	for	independence,	finally	culminated	with	success	that	ended	US	domination	of	the	country.		
While	historians	outside	Cuba	tend	to	view	the	Cuban	Revolution	as	beginning	with	1959,	Cuban	
historians	in	Cuba	perceive,	and	the	Cuban	national	narrative	portrays,	the	events	of	1959	and	
afterwards	as	part	of	a	longer	process	of	Cuban	emancipation;	a	struggle	that	continues	in	the	face	of	
not	just	American	imperialism	but	more	recently	the	soft	imperialism	of	neoliberal	globalization.10	That	
foreign	scholars,	especially	scholars	from	the	US,	fail	to	acknowledge,	much	less	address,	the	Cuban	
perspective	is	more	than	a	remnant	of	the	US-USSR	Cold	War	of	the	mid-twentieth	century;	it	is	the	
extended	legacy	of	European	colonialism	and	continuing	US	imperial	designs	upon	Cuba.	Those	
historically	informed	ideological	blinkers	limit	the	ongoing	relationships	between	Cuba	and	the	United	
States	and,	of	course,	directly	affected	the	awarding	of	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	to	Cuba	and	the	
subsequent	preparations	for	those	Games.	
At	the	same	time,	this	article	uses	of	a	number	of	pronouncements	made	by	Fidel	Castro.	These	
statements	are	not	taken	to	be	verified	facts	unless	alternate,	corroborating	sources	report	similar	
information.	Rather,	Castro’s	pronouncements	are	treated	as	aspirational	and	ideological	statements	
intended	to	convince	Cubans	and	other	audiences	that	his	interpretation	of	the	situation	on	the	ground	
is	the	correct	one.	The	challenges	within	Cuban	historiography	are	not	separating	Castro’s	perspective	
from	the	rest	but	from	gaining	access	to	the	documentation	that	would	verify	or	refute	any	such	claims,	
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whether	Castro’s	or	his	critics’.	Unfortunately,	the	difficulties	in	obtaining	such	information	means	this	
article	cannot	do	much	more	than	acknowledge	this	particular	limitation	and	context.11	
	 	
Pan	American	Games	and	Pan-Americanism	
The	Pan	American	Games	are	a	curious	phenomenon.	They	were	not	the	first	global	sport	spectacle	in	
the	Americas,	given	the	antecedents	of	the	Central	American	and	Caribbean	Games	(begun	in	1926).	Nor	
are	the	Pan	American	Games	the	only	regional	sports	spectacles.	Others	include	the	South	American	
Games	(begun	in	1978),	the	Central	American	Games	(begun	in	1973)	and	even	the	most	recent	ALBA	
Games	(begun	in	2005).12	Begun	in	1951,	the	Pan	American	Games	are	part	of	the	Olympic	network	of	
global	sport	spectacles.	They	along	with	the	other	International	Olympic	Committee	recognized	regional	
international	sport	spectacles,	the	Asian	Games,	Pacific	Games,	and	All-Africa	Games,	are	organized	
around	the	same	structure	as	the	IOC	in	which	members’	National	Olympic	Committees	form	the	
membership	of	each	regional	organization.	The	Pan	American	Games	thus	serve	as	an	Olympic	qualifying	
event	and	are	held	the	year	before	any	Summer	Olympiad	on	a	four-year	cycle.	However,	the	Olympic	
connection	is	not	broadly	promoted	nor	are	the	Pan	American	Games	portrayed	as	a	“regional	
Olympiad.”	The	active	disassociation	and	obscuring	of	the	Olympic	connection	is	curious	and	bears	
further	scrutiny;	however,	such	a	concern	is	beyond	the	remit	of	this	contribution.	Instead,	the	Pan	
American	Games	authorities	attempt	to	make	themselves	and	the	Games	distinct	from	any	Olympic	
ethos	despite	their	structural	position	in	the	global	sports	industry.			
As	an	important	spectacle,	the	Games	themselves	are	contradictory	in	nature.	Attention	paid	to	
the	Games	depends	greatly	on	the	host	nation	and	each	American	nation’s	geopolitical	position	in	the	
hemisphere.	This	fragmented	interest	is	indicative	of	the	underlying	tension	within	the	Games.	Despite	
the	name,	the	Pan	American	Games	are	not	ideologically	coherent	in	the	way	that	the	Olympic	Games	
promote	a	specific	worldview	labeled	“Olympism”	or	even	the	way	other	international	sport	federations	
promote	a	singular	view	of	their	specific	sport.	Additionally,	the	other	regional	international	sport	
spectacles	never	had	an	associated	unifying	political	ideology	implied	or	imbued	with	those	events	
themselves.	The	Pan	American	Games’	very	name,	however,	implies	political	unification	under	a	singular	
vision	of	“America”.	That	vision,	however,	is	not	singular	but	bifocal	and	comes	with	or	without	an	
accent.		The	Pan	American	Games	in	practice	counter	any	unity	and	instead	promulgate	opposing	Pan	
Americanist	projections	that	replicate	and	effectively	embody	the	competing	visionary	versions,	America	
and	América,	through	athletic	competition.13	That	the	two	most	successful	countries	over	the	history	of	
the	Games	are	intense	political	rivals	with	clearly	divergent	perspectives	and	strong	political	agendas	
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beyond	their	own	shores,	only	reinforces	the	simple	realization	that	there	is	no	unified	Pan-American	
nation	despite	attempts	to	forge	such	links	makes	the	Pan	American	Games	closer	to	the	how	the	
Olympic	Games	were	perceived	during	the	US-Soviet	Cold	War	in	which	two	political	camps	used	
international	sport	to	demonstrate	symbolically	its	superiority	over	the	other.				
These	ideological	tensions	cloud	the	purpose	of	the	Pan	American	Games.	Further	obscuring	our	
understanding	of	the	spectacle	is	the	simple	fact	that	a	comprehensive	history	of	the	Pan	American	
Games	is	yet	to	be	written.	Yes,	there	are	various	nationally-based	publications	that	provide	the	
statistical	evidence	that	the	Games	did	occur,	records	of	who	won,	which	countries	won	the	most	
medals,	where	and	when	each	edition	of	the	Games	was	held.	They	prove	the	Games	happen,	that	they	
exist,	but	these	records	are	not	history	or	historiography;	they	are	just	that,	records.	Any	history	of	this	
hemispheric,	atmospheric,	sporting	festival	is	problematic	for	it	will	be	an	attempt	to	speak	of	Latin	
American	sport.	Yet	the	existence	of	an	entity	that	we	can	call	Latin	American	sport	is	something	
extremely	problematic.14	To	attribute	some	historical	force	to	Pan-	or	Latin	American	sport	is	dubious	
since	the	evolution	of	sport	throughout	the	Western	hemisphere	has	almost	entirely	been	based	on	
state-building	projects	tied	to	national	agendas.15		
Part	of	the	problem	is	the	lack	of	readily	available	historical	documents	related	to	sport	
throughout	Latin	America,	including	Cuba,	and	the	critical	study	of	sport	throughout	the	hemisphere.	
Aside	from	the	United	States	and	Canadian	scholarship,	there	is	a	grave	paucity	of	the	serious	study	of	
sport	throughout	the	rest	of	the	hemisphere.	Records	are	difficult	to	identify,	much	less	access	and	what	
accounts	there	are	have	often	been	written	by	either	journalists	or	amateur	historians.	These	accounts	
tend	to	be	populist,	descriptive,	untheoretical	and	acritical	of	any	intersecting	political	economic	forces.	
This	is	generally	the	case	with	Cuban	sport	as	well,	with	the	majority	of	chronicles	being	produced	by	
either	journalists	or	former	sports	figures	or	administrators.16	There	are,	of	course,	a	couple	of	notable	
exceptions.	One	was	the	internationally	recognized	scholar	Radoul	Ruiz	Aguilera	who	sadly	passed	away	
in	the	mid-1990s	and	a	couple	of	recently	emerging	scholars,	especially	Felix	Julio	Alfonso’s	work	on	
Cuban	baseball.17	Like	Cuban	scholarship,	the	situation	has	only	begun	to	change	elsewhere,	especially	
in	Argentina,	Brazil	and	Mexico,	in	this	century.18	Yet	the	overall	point	remains:	what	scholarship	there	is	
focuses	on	the	national	and	there	is	nothing	that	considers	regional,	transnational	or	global	foci	that	
could	be	construed	to	be	Pan	American,	Latin	American,	or	other	form	of	Americanisms.		Interestingly,	
Cesar	Torres	has	produced	noteworthy	work	on	how	global	institutions	like	the	International	Olympic	
Committee	(IOC)	have	inserted	themselves	into	the	hemisphere	and	extended	the	domain	of	their	
reach.19	Others,	such	as	Antonio	Sotomayor’s	studies	of	Puerto	Rico’s	sport-related	politics,	are	
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beginning	to	approach	these	self-same	politics	but	not	from	the	imposition	of	“soft”	imperial	relations	in	
a	post-colonial	era	but	as	internal	nationalist	struggles	within	the	context	of	a	regionalized	imperialist	
structure	of	power.20	Their	work	reinforces	my	point	that	it	is	misleading	to	think	of	the	Pan	American	
Games	as	an	expression	of	a	regional	nationalism	of	either	vision	of	America,	with	or	without	an	accent,	
or	as	some	ideological	construct	that	allows	for	a	Latin	American	construct.	Now,	even	after	fifty	years,	
the	purpose	of	the	Pan	American	Games	is	still	not	clear.	
A	few	years	ago,	I	asked	that	greater	attention	be	paid	to	the	global	spectacles	of	sport	beyond	
the	obvious	--	the	Olympic	Games	and	the	FIFA	World	Cup	--	particularly	the	regional	spectacles	that	
underpin	the	global	sports	industries.21	What	most	concerned	me	was	that	scholars	were	pursuing	the	
low-hanging	fruit;	the	easy	options	as	it	were.	And	in	so	doing,	coming	up	with	easy	answers	to	
perplexing	problems.	Certainly	the	Olympic	industry	and	its	sundry	related	elements	of	the	global	sports	
industry	should	be	examined	in	a	most	critical	manner	as	a	number	of	scholars	have	now	done.22	Yet	
their	work	does	not	embrace	the	entire	monolithic	shibboleth	that	has	become	the	twenty-first	century	
network	of	global	sport	industries	that	includes,	amongst	other	things,	the	various	other	international	
sport	spectacles	that	feed	the	Olympic	behemoth.	For	what	underpins	all	these	global	spectacles	are	the	
political	wrangling	for	control	of	this	industry,	a	cut-throat	struggle	imbued	with	internecine	political	
rivalries,	corporate	greed,	self-appointed	aggrandizement	and,	beneath	that	entire	mess,	a	question	of	
the	purpose	to	which	sport	should	be	put	and	how	the	answer	to	that	question	should	be	implemented.		
Whatever	the	Pan	American	Games	purport	to	be,	these	spectacles	barely	register	in	the	United	
States	public’s	general	awareness	with	the	singular	exception	of	when	the	Cubans	compete	against	the	
US.	They	simply	do	not	attract	the	attention	that	many	other	sport	spectacles,	national	and	increasingly	
global,	do.	Canadians’	view	of	the	Games	appears	relatively	similar	although	the	morbidly	rabid	
fascination	with	the	Cubans	is	not	part	of	their	particular	perspective.23	Yet	throughout	much	of	the	rest	
of	the	hemisphere,	the	Games	take	on	national	significance,	especially	when	athletes	have	a	chance	to	
earn	a	medal.	Cuba	is	no	exception.	The	Pan	American	Games	play	a	significant	role	in	the	reinforcement	
of	Revolutionary	cubanidad	(Cubanness)	and	burgeoning	nationalist	pride	on	the	one	hand	and	Cuban	
success	in	the	Games	serve	to	symbolically	prove	the	vitality	and	viability	of	the	Cuban	Revolution’s	
worldview	to	the	rest	of	the	Américas	as	a	viable	challenger	to	the	bullying	hegemony	of	the	US	on	the	
other.		
	
The	international	context	leading	up	to	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	
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Cuba	was	awarded	the	privilege	of	hosting	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	in	1986.	That,	in	itself,	was	
seen	as	a	major	victory	by	Cuban	leaders.	The	awarding	of	the	Games	to	Cuba	was	the	result	of	
considerable	political	deliberation	by	the	Organización	Deportiva	Panamericana/Pan	American	Sports	
Organization	(ODEPA/PASO),	the	“august”	body	of	National	Olympic	Committee	members	of	the	
Western	Hemisphere,	overseeing	the	continuing	cycle	of	the	Games	themselves,	and	direct	bilateral	
negotiations	between	the	US	and	Cuban	PASO	officials.		
The	deployment	of	sport’s	soft	power	in	international	politics	was	abundantly	apparent	to	all	
around	the	world	in	the	decade	leading	up	to	the	1991	Pan	American	Games.	Olympic	boycotts	of	the	
1976,	1980,	and	1984	Summer	Games	made	it	abundantly	clear	that	sport	was	clearly	understood	as	a	
political	instrument	by	governments	around	the	world.	Political	hostility	between	the	governments	of	
the	US	and	Cuba	fueled	speculation	over	what	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	would	be	like.	American	
political	vitriol	spilled	into	the	sporting	arena	long	before	it	was	announced	that	Havana	would	host	the	
1991	Games.	The	tit-for-tat	Olympic	boycotts	of	1980	and	1984	meant	that	the	Cubans	had	not	
participated	in	the	Los	Angeles	Games.	There	were	some	questions	in	international	circles,	led	by	
speculation	amongst	US	officials,	that	the	Cubans	would	not	participate	in	the	1987	Pan	American	
Games.	Cuba	had	bid	for	the	Games	but	was	not	awarded	them.	Given	their	earlier	no-show	at	the	1984	
Los	Angeles	Games,	there	was	a	concern	that	the	Cubans	would	not	participate	since	the	Games	were	to	
be	held	in	the	US	mainland	(the	1979	Pan	American	Games	were	held	in	Puerto	Rico).	Unnamed	
members	of	ODEPA/PASO	expressed	concerns	over	whether	the	Cubans	were	serious	and	how	any	
commitment	to	Cuba	would	also	bind	Cuba	to	hosting	the	1991	Pan	American	Games.	When	the	Games	
were	awarded	in	November	1986,	Cuba’s	right	to	host	the	Games	was	contingent	upon	their	agreement	
to	participate	in	both	the	1987	Pan	American	Games	and	the	1988	Seoul	Olympic	Games.24	
A	principal	driver	of	these	concerns	was	not	political	but	rather	economic	factors.	Although	the	
US	government	publicly	expressed	no	concerns,	the	head	of	the	United	States	Olympic	Committee,	
Robert	Helmick	(and	thus,	the	US	National	Olympic	Committee	representative	for	PASO)	did	have	
concerns,	economic	ones	that	echoed	broader	ODEPA/PASO	concerns	about	the	economic	viability	of	
the	Games.	The	main	protagonists,	however,	were	private	American	players,	not	public	bodies.	The	US	
television	corporation	CBS	knew	that	the	absence	of	the	Cubans	would	lessen	any	potential	
entertainment	value	the	1987	Games	might	hold	for	an	US	audience	as	the	Cuban	sports	contingent	was	
often	the	only	viable	competition	to	American	athletes	in	these	Games.25	That	this	athletic	rivalry	could	
be	linked	to	the	ongoing	Soviet-American	Cold	War	made	the	spectacle	all	the	more	compelling,	
symbolic,	and	telling	while	simultaneously	demonstrating	how	sport	consistently	promotes	specific	
8	
	
worldviews	in	the	realm	of	international	politics.26	CBS’s	intervention	is	yet	another	example	of	the	
initiative	taken	by	private	sport-related	corporate	interests	rather	than	the	US	government.27	
US-Cuba	relations	were	already	strained	as	a	result	of	American	intransigent	insistence	that	no	
US	company	could	be	involved	in	the	preparations	for	the	1991	Games.	The	US	Treasury	Department’s	
Office	of	Foreign	Assets	Control	(OFAC)	prevented	various	US	companies	from	acting	as	suppliers	of	
needed	materials,	constructions	supplies,	sports	equipment,	and	other	sundry	resources,	forcing	the	
Cubans	to	find	alternative,	more	expensive,	if	only	because	of	the	longer	transport	costs,	suppliers.	
Those	trade	restrictions	quietly	passed	unnoticed	until	the	question	of	media	coverage	arose.	Then	the	
issue	became	much	more	public	as	the	three	major	US	media	corporations	of	the	time	all	reported	on	
ABC’s	difficulties	with	the	US	government	regarding	what	they	all	(NBC,	CBS,	and	ABC)	saw	as	illegal	
restrictions	on	their	own	trade.	The	difference	between	the	media	industry	and	others	prevented	from	
engaging	with	Cuban	businesses	was	that	the	media	corporations	could	air	their	own	grievances	and	
thus	make	what	had	been	a	nearly	thirty-year	practice	suddenly	become	a	“public”	concern.		
	ABC	came	to	an	agreement	with	the	1991	Games	organizers	that	the	television	rights	for	the	US	
market	would	cost	US$9	million.	However,	the	Trading	with	the	Enemy	Act	was	still	in	force	(and	
remains	in	force).	That	Act	prohibits	any	American	interest	(citizen	or	business)	from	conducting	any	
form	of	economic	transaction	with	any	Cuban	citizen	without	the	express	written	consent	of	the	OFAC	in	
the	form	of	a	“special	license.”28	ABC	applied	for	just	such	a	license	but	was	refused.	ABC	went	to	federal	
court	to	allow	a	payment	of	US$8.7	million	to	be	paid	to	the	Pan	American	Games	Organizing	
Committee.29	However,	that	avenue	also	proved	fruitless	because	three-quarters	of	that	money	would	
go	directly	the	Cuban	government	to	help	pay	for	the	Games.	ABC	appealed,	arguing	for	an	exception	
due	to	its	media	status,	and	that	as	a	news	gathering	institution,	it	was	inconsistent	with	the	freedom	of	
speech	guaranteed	in	the	US	Constitution.30	Furthermore,	ABC	lawyers	argued,	the	US	was	not	
prohibiting	the	thousand	strong	American	contingent	of	athletes	and	coaches	from	traveling	to	and	
staying	in	Cuba	for	the	duration	of	the	Games.	The	OFAC	wanted	any	such	payment	to	be	placed	in	a	
blocked	account	held	in	a	US	bank,	something	that	occurred	on	a	regular	basis	whether	the	monies	were	
for	Cuban	disaster	relief	activities	in	stricken	countries	or	wealthy	Cuban	industrialists	claiming	loss	of	
income	due	to	the	nationalization	of	industries	in	Cuba	in	the	early	1960s.31	Any	money	in	those	blocked	
accounts	will	only	be	released	when	the	US	Congress	decides	changes	in	the	Cuban	government	are	
sufficiently	satisfactory	to	warrant	the	funds’	release.	The	funds	ABC	was	providing	would	have	gone	
directly	to	the	Cubans	to	help	fund	the	hosting	of	the	Games	and	it	was	argued	in	court	that	if	the	funds	
were	not	released,	coverage	of	the	Games	would	be	impossible.	ABC	eventually	won	its	case	but	only	by	
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signing	an	agreement	waiving	the	fee	despite	legal	arguments	that	the	US	Congress’	enactment	of	the	
Berman	Amendment	was	formal	recognition	that	the	Trading	with	the	Enemy	Act	was	subordinate	to	
the	First	Amendment	right	to	free	speech.32	
US	media	corporations’	ability	to	provide	media	coverage	of	the	1987	and	1991	Pan	American	
Games	is	only	one	example	of	the	ongoing	hostile	international	relations	insinuated	into	the	Pan	
American	Games	because	of	latent	US-Cuba	hostilities.	Most	of	this	overt	action	has	been	taken	by	the	
US	government	authorities	in	direct	attempts	to	prevent	the	Cuban	national	teams	from	competing	and	
also	covertly	supporting	direct	violence	against	the	Cuban	government	and	its	representatives,	including	
Cuban	teams	in	international	competition.		The	history	of	these	ongoing	attempts	to	exclude	the	Cubans	
from	the	international	stage	through	various	antagonistic	and	punitively	pedantic	bureaucratic	acts	
predates	and	continues	after	the	1991	Games.		
For	example,	US	authorities	attempted	to	prevent	Cuba’s	participation	in	the	Tenth	Central	
American	and	Caribbean	Games	held	in	San	Juan,	Puerto	Rico	in	1966.	US	authorities	first	refused	to	
issue	visas	to	Cuban	athletes	and	then	insisted	after	reluctantly	backing	away	from	that	position	that	the	
Cubans	had	to	enter	Puerto	Rico	from	a	third	country	and	could	not	travel	direct	to	Puerto	Rico	from	
Cuba.	Rejecting	such	a	nonsensical	assertion,	the	Cuban	contingent	decided	to	travel	by	ship.33	As	the	
Cerro	Pelado	approached	Puerto	Rican	shores,	US	warplanes	intercept	the	ship,	threaten	it	with	
destruction,	and	otherwise	attempt	to	deter	its	arrival	in	port.34	The	spectacle	of	overt	aggression	could	
only	be	taken	so	far.		
Passive	aggression	through	tactics	of	denial,	however,	could	and	did	continue.	US	government	
officials	attempted	to	restrict	Cuban	participation	in	the	1979	Pan	American	Games	in	San	Juan,	Puerto	
Rico	as	well	as	the	1987	Games	held	in	Indianapolis,	Indiana.	This	petty	antagonism	continued	with	
similar	tactics	attempted	for	an	exhibition	baseball	game	held	in	Baltimore,	Maryland	in	1999,	which	
required	presidential	intervention	to	allow	the	event	to	occur.35	Similarly,	US	officials	attempted	to	
interfere	with	Major	League	Baseball’s	World	Baseball	Classic	by	refusing	to	allow	the	Cuban	contingent	
to	enter	the	US	and	by	US	Congressional	representatives	suggesting	a	Cuban	“national”	team	could	be	
formed	from	Cuban	exiles.	It	required	the	International	Olympic	Committee’s	intercession,	via	the	
United	States	Olympic	Committee,	to	put	a	halt	to	that	edition	of	these	antagonisms.36	
In	comparison,	Cuban	government	officials	have	never	hindered	the	participation	of	US	athletes	
in	international	sports	events	held	in	Cuba,	nor	do	they	consider	the	actual	sporting	arenas	of	
international	sport	competition	to	be	a	venue	for	airing	international	relations	grievances.	Rather,	
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Cuban	attitudes	toward	sport	see	it	as	a	useful	form	of	soft	power	for	international	diplomacy	through	
engagement	and	rapprochement.	
Cuban	internationalism	
The	Cuban	approach	to	internationalism	combines	aspects	of	international	solidarity,	national	interest,	
and	the	pursuit	of	development	goals	at	home	and	abroad.	The	Cuban	government	creates	and	seeks	
opportunities	to	engage	in	collaboration,	diplomacy,	commerce,	and	trade	in	order	to	project	its	own	
concepts	of	progressive	development,	while	also	garnering	much	needed	hard	currency	and	political	
benefits	for	its	national	interests.	Cuban	internationalism	has	received	significant	scholarly	attention	in	
policy	domains	such	as	health	care	and	the	culture	industries.37	Despite	growing	attention	paid	to	the	
soft	power	of	Cuban	cultural	industries	and	the	transnational	nature	of	Cuban	cultural	products	(dance,	
music,	literature,	film),	sport	remains	absent	from	these	discussions	despite	sport’s	pervasiveness	in	
Cuban	society.	Similarly,	much	of	the	scholarship	on	Cuban	foreign	policy	does	not	give	any	credence	
whatsoever	to	Cuban	sport-based	internationalism,	although	sport’s	use	as	a	form	of	soft	power	by	
Cuba	is	beginning	to	be	recognized.38			
Nevertheless,	Cuba	has	used	sport	as	an	instrument	of	soft	power	throughout	the	twentieth	
century,	particularly	throughout	the	Américas.	The	Cuban	government’s	pursuance	of	host	city	for	
global	sport	spectacles	predates	the	Revolution	and	follows	on	after	the	1991	Pan	American	Games.	
Havana	hosted	the	second	Central	American	Games	in	1930.	Since	the	1991	Games,	the	Revolutionary	
government	has	twice	attempted	to	make	Havana	an	Olympic	host	city,	failing	both	times	to	even	make	
the	first	cut.	Havana	has	served	as	a	Olympic	city	for	regional	qualifying	competitions	in	various	sports.	It	
has	also	hosted	other	international	sporting	spectacles,	from	baseball	exhibition	games	between	the	
Cuban	national	team	and	a	Major	League	Baseball	team	in	1999,	to	an	exhibition	match	between	the	
Venezuelan	and	Cuban	national	teams	with	both	Fidel	Castro	and	Hugo	Chavez	playing	active	parts	in	
the	exhibition	contest,	to	one	of	the	host	cities	of	ALBA	Games,	a	spectacle	designed	to	solidify	the	
political	trade	alliance	of	left-leaning	states	in	the	Americas	and	to	help	legitimate	the	ALBA	as	an	
international	organization.	It	would	appear	that	the	ALBA	Games,	hosted	three	times	by	Havana,	have	
not	managed	to	reinforce	what	appears	to	be	a	dissipating	political	and	economic	venture	of	left-leaning	
regional	alliance	building.	Despite	Cuba’s	involvement	in	several	other	sport-related	international	
initiatives	and	the	ongoing	use	of	sport	as	a	tool	for	international	diplomacy,	the	1991	Pan	American	
Games	remain	the	largest	direct	sporting	impact	on	the	Cuban	populace	of	any	international	sport	
spectacle.	
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Villa	Panamericana	and	urban	development	
Closer	to	home,	the	hosting	of	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	also	served	domestic	agendas.	In	large	
part	this	was	due	to	the	construction	of	the	Villa	Panamericana.	Largely	used	for	housing	and	health-
related	construction	projects,	microbrigadas	(microbrigades)	had	often	been	used	in	the	1970s	only	to	
be	disbanded	in	the	early	1980s	after	heavy	criticism	as	being	“unproductive”	because	they	had	no	
economic	basis	to	sustain	them.	These	work-force	mobilizations	had	been	used	to	build	hospitals,	health	
clinics,	sport	and	recreation	facilities,	day	care	centers,	and	spectacular	spaces	such	as	the	grounds	for	
the	new	international	ExpoCuba	on	the	edge	of	Havana	for	international	business	conventions.39	They	
were	revitalized	and	re-labelled	as	“social	brigades”	in	the	late	1980s	in	which	laborers	came	from	
neighbors	in	a	specific	area	instead	of	workers	from	a	given	workplace.		
	Microbrigadas’	re-emergence	were	due	in	part	to	the	increasing	economic	strains	as	the	USSR	
and	Eastern	European	states	altered	international	trade	agreements	overnight	in	1989	and	1990	
resulting	increasing	shortages	of	petrol	affecting	transport.	When	the	Cubans	initially	agreed	to	host	the	
1991	Games	in	1986,	their	economy	was	solid	and	state	leaders	did	not	face	any	challenges	that	any	
other	national	government	faced.	However,	the	Gorbachev-led	reforms	of	the	USSR	and	subsequent	
dissolution	of	the	USSR	and	Eastern	European	state	socialism	led	to	a	torrential	economic	collapse.	
Castro,	in	addressing	the	Union	of	Young	Communists	in	early	1992	claimed		
We	had	an	equitable	trade	exchange;	and	that	exchange	was	lost	from	one	night	to	the	
following	morning,	from	one	day	to	the	next.	Our	country	lost	more	than	50	percent	of	imports.	
They	were	imports	of	all	types:	food,	raw	materials,	equipment,	everything.	Our	country	lost	
over	US$4	billion	in	imports.	We	have	abruptly	lost	over	US$4	billion	in	exports.	Oil	consumption	
in	our	country	had	already	reached	13	million	tons.	Today	we	are	working	with	figures	closer	to	
6	million	tons,	less	than	half.40		
	
Castro’s	figures	are	in-line	with	other	economists’	estimates	ranging	from	an	overall	loss	of	50	to	85%	of	
GDP,	what	is	abundantly	apparent	is	that	the	final	push	to	finish	the	construction	of	the	Villa	
Panamericana	coincided	with	the	start	of	the	worst	domestic	economic	crisis	Revolutionary	Cuba	had	
ever	known.41	This	situation	had	to	have	a	direct	impact	on	Cubans’	ability	to	prepare	for	the	Pan	
American	Games	and	the	government’s	priorities.	The	Pan	American	Games	were	not	to	be	the	primary	
emphasis	of	Cuban	economic	strategy	according	to	Fidel	Castro	at	the	opening	of	the	Villa	Panamericana	
in	July	1991:	
	
Our	country	did	not	work	only	on	the	Pan-American	Games	projects.	They	have	been	a	very	
small	part	of	our	efforts.	When	one	day	there	were	4,000	or	5,000	people	working	here	
regularly,	there	were	almost	17,000	voluntary	workers	in	the	agricultural	camps	in	Havana	
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Province.	Havana	residents	in	those	camps,	Havana	residents	here,	and	the	largest	gatherings	
were	on	Sundays.	When	there	were	10,000	here,	there	were	25,000	there.42		
		
These	numbers	themselves	are	impossible	to	confirm.		Nevertheless,	the	costs,	to	which	an	economic	
figure	has	never	been	published,	were	enormous.	Delays	in	obtaining	constructions	materials	were	
demoralizing	and	rumors	of	the	apartments	and	facilities	being	used	for	foreigners	rather	than	the	
older,	established	practice	of	construction	workers	being	given	first	chance	at	these	new	homes	led	to	
some	worker-related	protests	and	laying	down	of	tools	–	though	it	is	difficult	to	discern	what	was	truly	
dissatisfaction	and	unrest	and	what	was	ruptures	in	the	transport	system	inhibiting	the	delivery	of	
necessary	material.	However,	for	many	other	social	brigades	elsewhere	in	the	country,	the	prioritization	
of	the	Villa	Panamericana	over	other	projects	proved	fatal	to	those	other	projects	due	to	the	scarcity	of	
building	materials	and	fuel.		
	 As	one	of	the	two	major	urban	housing	development	projects	in	Havana	in	the	1980s,	and	the	
last	major	housing	development	project	in	Havana,	Villa	Panamericana	comprised	55	new	buildings	and	
a	total	of	1473	new	apartments.43	However,	its	isolation	from	the	rest	of	Havana,	including	the	two	
easternmost	outskirts	of	Habana	del	Este	and	Alamar	has	resulted	in	the	rapid	deteriorization	of	the	
entire	neighborhood	despite	providing	state-of-the-art	housing.	As	a	bedroom	community,	it	simply	has	
not	functioned	well	due	to	the	ongoing	issues	with	transport	throughout	the	city.	Twenty	years	later,	I	
traveled	with	friends	of	mine	to	visit	family	members	who	live	in	Villa	Panamericana.	If	they	are	lucky,	
they	see	these	family	members	once	a	year.	It	had	been	three	years	since	their	last	visit	to	the	other	side	
of	Havana’s	bay	and	it	proved	to	be	an	all-day	odyssey	in	which	the	13	kilometers	from	Vedado	to	Villa	
Panamericana	required	three	to	four	hours	to	go	one	way.	As	a	stand-alone	suburb,	it	has	been	
reinvigorated	over	the	past	few	years	after	a	decade	of	rapid	deterioration.	
Villa	Panamericana	was	not	just	a	housing	project,	of	course.	Its	purpose	was	to	provide	state-
of-the	art	sporting	facilities	in	an	area	of	the	city	where	they	were	sadly	lacking.	This	particular	strategic	
practice	was	not	new	to	the	Revolutionary	government	as	outlined	elsewhere.44	A	significant	policy	
strategy	throughout	the	Revolutionary	era	has	been	the	massification	of	sport	through	the	provision	of	
facilities	throughout	the	country.	The	sports	project	that	constituted	the	Pan	American	Games	resulted	
not	only	in	the	numerous	facilities	built	along	the	coast	between	Habana	del	Este	and	Alamar	but	
throughout	the	city.	All	total	46	sports	facilities	were	constructed	as	part	of	the	Pan	American	Games	
initiative	of	which	21	were	sited	in	the	Villa	Panamericana.45	Olympic	stadiums,	tennis	courts,	swimming	
pools,	and	other	facilities	were	built	throughout	the	city	and	in	Santiago.	By	1992,	Havana	had	1206	
sport	facilities	with	a	seating	capacity	of	167,000	spectators.	The	difference	being	the	sport	complexes	
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were	integrated	with	the	Villa	Panamericana	from	the	outset	rather	than	an	ad	hoc	addition	to	existing	
facilities,	an	insertion	into	existing	urban	infrastructure,	such	as	the	Kid	Chocolate	Gymanasium,	or	
something	built	in	a	difficult	to	reach	location,	such	as	the	Sala	Polivalente	built	in	San	Jose	de	las	Lajas	
on	the	rural	outskirts	of	Havana.46	Construction	then	ground	to	a	sudden	halt;	the	Villa	Panamericana	
was	the	last	new	construction	project	in	the	capital.	Investment	in	the	tourism	industry	took	precedence	
and	the	refurbishment	of	dilapidated	hotels	and	other	buildings	in	Old	Havana	became	the	focus	of	
infrastructure	investment	throughout	the	1990s.		
	 Given	the	domestic	economic	context	at	the	time	of	the	Games,	the	purpose	of	the	facilities	
evolved	and	shifted	as	Castro	himself	asserted	when	speaking	with	Mandela	a	week	prior	to	the	opening	
ceremony.	These	words	were,	of	course,	aspirational.		
The	stadium	can	even	be	expanded,	and	the	areas	we	have	here	are	for	us	to	build	more	if	we	
want.	Part	of	these	facilities	will	go	to	serve	tourism.	Most	of	the	village	will	pass	into	the	hands	
of	those	who	worked	to	build	it.	Not	all	of	them,	because	tens	of	thousands	of	people	worked	
on	this	village,	but	most	of	the	buildings	and	apartments	will	pass	into	the	hands	of	those	who	
worked	regularly	to	build	them.	So	about	1,000	families-I	do	not	remember	the	exact	number-
will	live	in	these	palaces	we	have	built	as	the	Pan	American	Village.47	
	
The	infrastructure	of	Villa	Panamericana	has	deteriorated	since	those	heady	days	in	1991.	Buildings	have	
fallen	into	disrepair,	the	Estadio	Olímpico	is	empty	and	padlocked	though	it	has	had	a	recent	makeover.	
Other	sporting	facilities	have	also	fallen	derelict	through	disuse.	The	economic	pressures	of	the	ensuing	
decade	meant	that	the	maintenance	of	such	facilities	was	not	that	high	on	the	government’s	priority	list.	
Indeed,	the	Pan	American	Games	facilities	were	not	the	only	sports	facilities	to	fall	into	utter	disrepair	
rendering	them	unusable.	Castro	noted	that		
I	think	there	are	about	150	pools	which	were	built	for	recreation…	We	have	to	look	at	all	the	
available	facilities-I	think	there	are	about	150-and	see	how	they	can	be	organized	for	mass	
participation,	much	greater	participation,	with	these	same	facilities.	Sometimes	the	problem	is	a	
lack	of	chlorine,	or	some	little	pump	is	broken.	The	pool	in	Martí	Park	has	not	been	open	for	
months,	but	the	pool	in	Camilo	Cienfuegos	Park,	which	is	nearby,	is	working.	I	told	those	
comrades,	we	have	to	fix	it.	What	is	needed	is	minor.	How	can	we	close	down	a	pool	for	so	long	
because	of	some	small	part?	Sometimes	it	is	a	matter	of	organizing	who	would	transport	the	
chlorine.	Sometimes	the	problem	is	not	a	shortage	of	chlorine	but	that	no	truck	is	available	to	
transport	it.48	
	
Castro’s	comments	are	an	acknowledgment	of	the	burgeoning	economic	disaster	that	was	to	become	
the	Special	Period	in	Times	of	Peace.	The	effects	of	this	looming	crisis	affected	taken-for-granted,	basic	
everyday	interactions.	That	Cuban	officials	stuck	to	the	commitments	they	made	five	years	earlier	when	
the	domestic	economy	and	the	country’s	international	trade	were	robust	and	reliable	is	significant.	The	
hosting	of	the	Pan	American	Games	demonstrated	Cuban	resiliency	and	reliability	to	its	international	
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commitments	–	a	vital	symbolic	indication	given	at	a	moment	when	all	the	terms	of	international	
economic	agreements	were	being	(re)negotiated.	
	
Conclusion:	
The	true	triumph	of	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	was	not	Cuba	topping	the	medal	table,	outpacing	the	
US	for	the	first	time	in	the	Games	history.	The	real	success	was	that	Cuba	navigated	unforeseen	and	
extremely	challenging	circumstances	to	host	the	Games	at	all.	The	Games	were	a	success	both	
internationally	and	domestically	from	the	host’s	standpoint.		
	 Internationally,	the	1991	Pan	American	Games	were	a	success	for	they	provided	concrete	
evidence	that	Cuba	would	abide	by	its	international	agreements	even	in	the	face	of	severe	adversity.	
Hosting	the	Games	provided	an	opportunity	for	Cuba	to	renew	its	existing	relations	and	reopen	relations	
with	other	Latin	American	countries.	Despite	the	sudden	and	unexpected	changes	in	the	global	political	
contexts	causing	an	increase	of	overt	political	pressure	from	its	antagonist	to	the	North,	that	Cuba	did	
not	renege	on	its	promise	reaffirmed	the	Cuban	government’s	staunch	defiance	of	self-determination	in	
the	face	outside	forces.	As	much	as	possible	Cuba	hosted	the	Games	on	its	terms.	It	boycotted	the	1988	
Seoul	Olympic	Games	despite	the	stipulation	that	it	would	attend	as	part	of	the	PASO	agreement	that	
Cuba	would	host	the	1991	Pan	American	Games.		It	found	foreign	suppliers	of	materiel	that	it	could	not	
provide,	such	as	the	Games’	hockey	pitch,	under	favorable	economic	agreements.	Those	agreements	
proved	essential	as	Cuba’s	international	trade	agreements	and	its	monetary	reserve	dissolved	practically	
overnight.	
	 Facing	an	impending	domestic	economic	disaster,	Cuban	authorities	became	even	more	creative	
at	finding	solutions	to	the	challenges	they	faced.	In	a	stroke	from	the	past,	they	resurrected	the	
microbrigadas	from	the	1970s	and	early	1980s.	Social	brigades	did	not	just	build	the	sports	facilities	but	
an	entire	new	suburb	of	Havana.	The	construction	of	the	Villa	Panamericana	was	the	last	major	new	
urban	construction	project	using	the	microbrigadas	as	construction	labor.	The	microbrigadas	were	not	
resurrected	for	the	Pan	American	Games.	Rather,	that	reinstitution	of	these	labor	organizations	was	
tactical	move	to	begin	to	address	the	plummeting	economy	as	a	means	to	employ	an	increasingly	idle	
labor	force.	Their	primary	focus	was	the	revitalization	of	neighborhoods	with	an	emphasis	on	building	on	
empty	lots	and	derelict	properties	but	what	they	were	not	used	for	was	the	construction	of	new	
neighborhoods.	They	were	also	used	for	the	construction	of	the	Pan	American	Games	facilities	in	
Havana	and	Santiago	de	Cuba.	Further,	the	focus	of	construction	moved	from	social	needs	like	housing	
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to	economic	ones,	such	as	the	tourism	infrastructure,	in	an	attempt	to	replace	the	lost	revenue	stream	
following	the	collapse	of	Cuba’s	international	trade	agreements.		
Of	course,	the	Pan	American	Games	construction	projects	were	not	unmitigated	successes.	
While	the	facilities	in	the	area	around	the	Villa	Panamericana,	such	as	the	Estadio	Olimpico	have	
become	rather	dilapidated	and	requiring	further	refurbishment,	other	facilities	in	the	center	of	Havana,	
such	as	the	Kid	Chocolate	gymnasium	and	Ramon	Fonst	arena	are	both	vibrant	and	active	sites	of	Cuban	
sport.	Although	Cuban	officials	followed	the	usual	strategy	of	Olympic	host	cities	regarding	the	after-
event	use	of	the	“athletes’	village”,	the	Cubans	actually	fulfilled	their	plan:	the	Villa	Panamericana	
became	home	to	several	thousand	Cubans.	In	that	regard,	the	Villa	Panamericana	has	been	a	greater	
success	than	any	Olympic	Village	ever	built	for	a	Summer	or	Winter	Games.	
This	paper	contributes	a	preliminary	chapter	in	a	nascent	history	of	the	Pan	American	Games.	
Overall,	this	article	excavates	the	underpinning	currents	in	the	preparations	to	the	1991	Pan	American	
Games.	Given	the	circumstances	in	and	beyond	Cuba	in	the	years	leading	up	the	very	moment	Castro	
made	that	momentous	pronouncement,	the	opening	ceremonies	were	an	enormous	achievement	in	
and	of	themselves.	The	Cold	War	contexts	underpinning	the	preparations	for	the	1991	Pan	American	
Games	provided	additional	challenges	beyond	the	usual	sort	of	planning	difficulties	faced	by	a	Games	
host.	The	unanticipated	additional	political	and	economic	threats	due	to	the	collapse	of	the	country’s	
international	trade	agreements	meant	that	Revolutionary	sport	and	the	Cuban	Revolution	itself	were	
under	enormous	pressure.	While	unanticipated	changes	in	economy	and	politics	are	not	unprecedented	
for	host	nations,	the	actual	threat	of	the	dissolution	of	the	state	as	part	of	those	changing	contexts	for	a	
host	is	unique.	The	unequivocal	athletic	and	political	success	of	meeting	those	pressures	while	hosting	
the	Games	effectively	bought	the	time	needed	for	the	Cuban	government	reorient	its	tactics	and	to	shift	
its	practices	to	generate	hard-currency	income.	It	was	not	recognized	at	the	time,	but	looking	back,	the	
1991	Pan	American	Games	saved	not	only	Cuban	sport	but	provided	the	spectacular	evidence	needed	to	
help	save	the	Revolutionary	state	itself.				
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